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1. Introduction
It is increasingly common to theorize the “racialization”
of American Muslims (Bayoumi, 2015; Cainkar, 2009;
Carr & Haynes, 2015; Galonnier, 2015; Garner & Selod,
2015; Ibrahim, 2008; Selod, 2015; Selod&Embrick, 2013).
Yet theories of the racialization of American Muslims can
often run into two problems. First, these arguments tend
not to refer to all American Muslims, which are a di-
verse and heterogeneous category (GhaneaBassiri, 2010;
Hussain, 2016), but rather to immigrant Muslims. Sec-
ond, these theories also emphasize a top-down process
of racialization, occluding the ways that immigrant Mus-
lims are able to leverage certain kinds of racial ambigu-
ity. This article builds upon Neda Maghbouleh’s (2017)
concept of “racial hinges” to describe how immigrant
Muslims in the United States deal with these ambigui-
ties, navigating their relationships among Muslims eth-
nicities and with African Americans and whites. In doing
so, I build on Melissa Wilde’s concept of “complex reli-
gion” (Wilde, 2017; Wilde & Glassman, 2016; Wilde &
Tevington, 2017) to argue that American Islam is only soci-
ologically intelligible through its intersections with other
salient identities especially, for the purposes of this ar-
ticle, race and ethnicity. Taking Wilde’s challenge to ren-
der more complex our understandings of religion, I argue
that not only should scholars acknowledge how Islam in
America is racialized but they should also show the com-
plicated ways in which immigration and ethnicity inter-
sect with these racialization processes.
In her study of Iranian Americans—many though not
all of whom are Muslim—Maghbouleh gets right at this
complexity, describing “racial hinges” as the processes
through which racial liminality “opens or closes the door
to whiteness as necessary” (Maghbouleh, 2017, p. 5).
In describing these hinges, Maghbouleh demonstrates
how, “for liminal racial groups, whiteness is fickle and
volatile” even for those, like Iranians and other immi-
grants from theMiddle East, who are considered “white”
by United States law and might consider themselves
white as well (Maghbouleh, 2017, p. 13). The state and
broader cultural processes are important here, but anal-
ysis of these processes can too often be exclusively top-
down (Maghbouleh, 2017, p. 170).
Maghbouleh shows how the racial experience of im-
migrant Muslims is not only about the security state
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and media representations depicting Muslims as racial-
ized others (Jamal, 2008), developing the term “racial
hinge” to describe how Iranian Americans can manipu-
late (or at least attempt to manipulate) their ambigu-
ous relationship to whiteness. As such, Maghbouleh’s
study of racial hinges and racial loopholes helps her to
understand how Iranian Americans navigate “the limits
of whiteness” and also the capacity to “forge new racial
identities…becoming brown by choice and by force”
(Maghbouleh, 2017, p. 172). In this article, I expand
upon the concept to describe how immigrant Ameri-
can Muslims can manipulate their relationship to white-
ness and black identity. It is important to acknowledge
that such agentic possibilities are not necessarily nor-
matively positive ones, and greater racial freedom can
sometimes lead to more capacity to leverage strategies
of racial domination.
By describing Muslims as at once racialized and capa-
ble of creative manipulation of racial categories, I chal-
lenge an “analytical groupism” (Brubaker, Loveman, &
Stamatov, 2004, p. 31) that can sometimes occur in stud-
ies of racialized Islam. Analytical groupism refers to a
tendency among both laypeople and academics to take
groups for granted as the most appropriate way to un-
derstand the world, an insight somewhat paralleled by
Wilde’s concept of “complex religion”. The concept of
American Muslim “racialization” can sometimes fall into
this groupist tendency, especially when assuming that
immigrant Muslims’ top-down racialized category is the
most salient means through which to understand them.
As will be discussed below, this is not to deny that im-
migrant Muslims are racialized or that such a category
is both politically and empirically important. It is sim-
ply to say that immigrant Muslims’ relationship to race
is more complex than their racialization by the security
state and popular culture, and that it is also a relation-
ship marked by agentic manipulation of various racial
strategies of action. Race, like any social category, is al-
ways a social accomplishment, and immigrant Muslims
have access to various, contextually motivated “strate-
gies of action” (Swidler, 1986) through which to enact
those accomplishments; they are able to do so in a way
that African American Muslims are not.
To be clear, immigrant Muslims’ access to a variety
of often contradictory racial and ethnic discourses is by
no means a net advantage: indeed, it is often the re-
sult of white supremacy, decades of colonial intervention
in immigrants’ countries of origin, and both explicit and
implicit bias. Institutionalized Islamophobia (Kundnani,
2014) compels Muslims to perform a “good Muslim” sta-
tus (Mamdani, 2005) even for those potential “liberal”
allies who claim to be religiously neutral. Yet, because of
many immigrantMuslims’ status as “brown” (Silva, 2010,
2016) rather than “black” in the United States racial or-
der (Emirbayer & Desmond, 2015), as well as their po-
tential ability to shift between ethnic, racial, and reli-
gious registers (in a way that African Americans cannot),
immigrant Muslims are able to engage political and cul-
tural problems through often contradictory approaches
to race, ethnicity, and religion. To be clear, to say Muslim
Americans are “brown” is not necessarily to argue many
of them self-identify as brown; it is simply to argue that,
as Silva, Maghbouleh and other theorists of the “brown”
identity have postulated, to be “brown” gives immigrant
Muslims a racial (and not simply ethnic) identity that is
nonetheless outside of the typical black/white binary.
For the purposes of this article, I describe “immigrant
Muslims” as those 76% of American Muslims who are ei-
ther immigrants or children of immigrants (Pew, 2017).
Histories of American Islam (e.g., GhaneaBassiri, 2010;
Husain 2017) often situate such immigrant Muslims—
many of whom came after changes in U.S. immigration
law in 1965—as separate from indigenous American Is-
lam, which is predominantly composed of blackMuslims
who have been in the United States much longer. Accord-
ing to Pew (2017), 20% of Muslim American adults self-
identify as black, of whom only 11% are foreign born. Of
those black Muslims born in the United States, over half
have families that have been in the United States for at
least three generations (Pew, 2017).
Inwhat follows, I will provide a briefmethods section,
a literature review of debates about the best way to cat-
egorize Islam in the United States, and finally, a theoret-
ical synthesis that combines some of my own empirical
work with other research on American Islam. I provide
two examples of immigrant Muslims’ racial strategies of
action: (1) white/colorblind acculturation, and (2) black
appropriation, suggesting in the conclusion that brown
solidarity could also be an important third form.
2. Methods
This article is primarily a theoretical synthesis of ear-
lier secondary literature, reframing previous work on the
racialization of Islam. However, to further develop my ar-
gument, I also draw from fieldwork at one of the schools
I studied as part of a broader comparative ethnographic
study of two Sunni Muslim and two Evangelical Christian
high schools. I spent a semester and a half at Al Amal
high school, a Muslim K-12 school in the New York City
area. There were about 200 students total in the school,
and most of the student body was Arab and South Asian,
with some students of African ancestry. In the calendar
year of 2011, I spent around two days a week at Al Amal,
observing classes, teaching an SAT class, and talking to
community members. I will be vague about some num-
bers and identifying characteristics to preserve confiden-
tiality, and I have used pseudonyms for people and the
school itself.
3. Islam Between Religion and Racialization
3.1. What Kind of Category is Islam?
Many social scientists have recently begun to describe Is-
lam in manners similar to how one would describe a race
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or ethnicity (Motyl, 2011). They echo a tendency in both
laypeople’s “categories of practice” and social scientists’
“categories of analysis” in considering religion as func-
tionally (if not substantially) similar to other categories of
difference, such as ethnicity, language, race, and region
of origin (Brubaker, 2013, pp. 4–5). As Rogers Brubaker
describes, the journal Ethnic and Racial Studies published
only 15 articles on religion before 1990 and, between
that time and the publication of his article in early 2013,
it had 88 articles on religion, 50% of which were about
Islam (Brubaker, 2013, p. 2). Yet simply because Islam is
being studied as a category with parallels to race does
not necessarily mean Islam is racialized. What makes Is-
lam racialized, rather, is the way that it takes on char-
acteristics often used to describe races, both via more
commonly studied top-down racialization processes (me-
dia, government) and less studied bottom-up processes
in which immigrant Muslims themselves take advantage
of “racial hinges” to navigate ambiguous racial situations.
Questions about Islam and race must therefore cen-
ter how Islam is both presented and experienced as a
category, and an important insight of studies of black
Islam as compared to immigrant Islam is that this cate-
gory is both presented and experienced in radically dis-
tinct ways for different groups of AmericanMuslims (Gre-
wal, 2013; Karim, 2008; Khabeer, 2016). As such, ques-
tions about the relationship between race and immigrant
Islam are necessarily related to (though still separate
from) questions about the relationship between immi-
grant and African American Muslims and the experience
of ethnicities often associated with Islam, such as Arabs
and South Asians (Love, 2017). While I will further dis-
cuss the analytic challenge of African American Muslims
for accounts of Muslim racialization below, it is worth ex-
amining here the relationship between ethnicities often
associated with Islam (such as Arabs) and Islam as itself
a racialized category.
Accounts of what it means to be Arab in America nar-
rate a “modelminority” status thatwas cut short by inter-
national events, “a general proximity to whiteness and
a sense of acceptance within white middle-class Amer-
ica up until the late 1980s and early 1990s, the period
in which the United States was consolidating its growing
imperial interests in the Middle East and North Africa”
(Naber, 2012, p. 26). In Jamal and Naber’s 2008 edited
volume, Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11,
various scholars describe how the experience of Arabs
after 2001 has been a particularly difficult one (see also
Bayoumi, 2009, 2015; Cainkar, 2009; Peek, 2011), though
that difficulty is inexplicable without acknowledging the
link between being Arab and being Muslim. Indeed, de-
spite the volume being a book about Arab Americans,
the phrases “Arabs andMuslims” or “Muslims and Arabs”
show up 19 times, and in six of the 12 chapters.
Such a linkage is not necessarily because Arabs are
Muslim (only 25% of Arab Americans are Muslim) or be-
causeAmericanMuslims areArab; the numbers aremore
difficult to determine here, but Pew says 41% of Ameri-
canMuslims identify as white, which would include Arab,
Persian, and “Middle Eastern” identities (Pew, 2017).
Rather, it is because anyone perceived as “brown” can
sometimes be assumed to be Muslim and, therefore, a
threat of Islamist terrorism (Silva, 2016), a finding consis-
tently discovered in work on bothMuslim Americans and
those assumed to beMuslim Americans (Bayoumi, 2009;
Mahalingam, 2012). For example, in his interviews with
Egyptian Americans, Zopf (2017) found that even his re-
spondents who identified as white were often not recog-
nized as white by other Americans, a finding paralleled
by Maghbouleh in her study of Iranian Americans.
Yet the fact that many Arab Americans are not Mus-
lim provides a window into the relationship between
race and Islam in the United States. In her study of racial
and ethnic identity among Muslim and Christian Arabs
in central Texas, Read (2008) found that “one-third of
Christian respondents report that other people consider
them ‘white’, compared to only 5.2% of Muslims”. She
goes on that only “a small fraction” ofMuslims feel “they
pass as ‘white’ Americans” (Read, 2008, pp. 312–313).
In this case, the term Arab American is understood as a
racial rather than an ethic category in that it is seen as
oppositional to rather than potentially coexistent with
being white. I found this in my own work as well. At
Al Amal, I met a blonde Palestinian-American Muslim
teacher, Dafir, who said he enjoyed surprising “white
people” when they found out he was an Arab. I asked
him if he considered himself white. “No”, he said proudly,
“I’m Arab”.
For Dafir, as well as for many of Read’s (and Magh-
bouleh’s) respondents, Arab or Iranian are racial cate-
gories and not simply ethnic ones. Furthermore, this
Arab racial category seems to be tied to Islam, mean-
ing that it is not just culture but a kind of religious
culture—rather than simply phenotype—that can racial-
ize. Of course, to argue that race is much more than skin
color is a very old insight in the sociology of race (Du
Bois, 2015; Omi&Winant, 2014), but it is helpful tomake
sense of how a religion like Islam can become racialized.
It was striking to me how often Dafir and others at Al
Amal (both teachers and students) conflated to be Arab
and to beMuslim, which I would later learn is a common
criticism from both non-Arab immigrant Muslims and
African American Muslims (Bilici, 2012; Jackson, 2005).
This tendency to conflate Arab and Muslim can happen
among the broader, non-Muslim public as well. Bayoumi
describes his 2009 book, How does it feel to be a prob-
lem?, asmostly a study ofMuslimsArabs, yet he nonethe-
less acknowledges throughout the ways that being Arab
and being Muslim are racialized, and in similar ways rela-
tive to the whims of a broader security apparatus.
Similarly, Cainkar’s 2009 book, Homeland insecurity,
is subtitled: “The Arab American and Muslim American
Experience After 9/11”. Cainkar argues that Arab identity
has become racialized to the degree that Arabs are seen
as having certain traits (e.g., violent, hateful) that are bi-
ological and essential:
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When similar social constructions about an inher-
ent tendency to violence were nearly seamlessly ex-
tended to Muslims, Arabs and Muslims came to be
viewed by many Americans in an undifferentiated
way…that was associated with a certain phenotype,
mode of dress, written script, type of name, set of re-
ligious beliefs and attitudes towards women, and spe-
cific countries of origin. (Cainkar, 2009, p. 109)
Bayoumi likewise argues that “Arabs and Muslims” are
“two overlapping categories, but in the world of Amer-
ican perceptions [they are] essentially the same thing”
(Bayoumi, 2009, p. 190). These are racial theories be-
cause they are about categories understood to be essen-
tial and unalterable.
Those “American perceptions” to which Bayoumi
refers are a longstanding habit of Islamophobia and the
essentialization of Muslims as fundamentally dangerous
and violent in entertainment and newsmedia (Bail, 2014;
Hussain, 2010; Marzouki, 2017; Saeed, 2007) as well as
in government discourse and policy decisions (Cainkar,
2009; Peek, 2011). Cainkar describes how special reg-
istration programs “give concrete meaning to essen-
tialized, undifferentiated representations of Arabs and
Muslims” (Cainkar, 2009, p. 58). Likewise, Bayoumi de-
scribes how “through special registration [of Muslims],
the [United States] government, in effect, turned a reli-
gion, namely Islam, into a race” (Bayoumi, 2015, p. 51).
Special registration programs required “adultmales from
twenty-four Muslim-majority countries…to register their
whereabouts in the country” (Bayoumi, 2015, p. 186),
thereby leveraging state power to maintain an overrid-
ing suspicion of Muslims as essentially violent and wor-
thy of suspicion.
Yet to say that Islam is racialized is not quite the
same as to say that Islam is a race. As Morning (2009)
defines it, race does not refer to any biological reality,
but rather to a sociological grouping of certain individ-
uals believed to share a common genealogical descent
marked by certain shared phenotypical traits. Morning
thereby distinguishes race from ethnicity, which, in the
American context, is viewed as optional and symbolic, ca-
pable of being chosen and rejected, “with the knowledge
that such identification will have little if any repercus-
sions for major life outcomes” (Morning, 2008, p. 242;
see also Gans, 1979; Waters, 2001). In contrast, “racial
identity is usually portrayed as involuntary—it is imposed
by others—and it is immutable, regardless of individ-
ual behavioral choices….This externally enforced affilia-
tion has profound and far-reaching effects on life out-
comes” (Morning, 2008, p. 242). As Morning finds re-
garding South Asian racial self-identifications (Morning,
2001), racial identity is often a function of other socio-
economic factors rather than simply reproducing par-
ents’ identity, a process demonstrated even in reference
to the seemingly intractable black-white binary (Roth,
2005; Saperstein & Penner, 2012). Islam is complicated
here: it fits the elements of Morning’s definition that list
race as involuntary, immutable, and having real effects
on the life course—at least in terms of how Islam is of-
ten perceived. Yet Islam is not—at least it is usually not—
considered a part of an immutable biology. The use of
the term racialized seems a helpful middle way, showing
how Islam might not be a race but that the experience
of Islam in the United States has various parallels with
racial categories.
Yet there are some important complications to the
work described above. First, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the description of Muslims as racialized tends
to emphasize post-1965 “immigrant” Islam over indige-
nous Islam, which is generally African-American. To be
clear, none of the authors mentioned above ignores
African American Islam: both Cainkar and Bayoumi, for
example, are careful to acknowledge the critical role
of African Americans in Muslim American history and
the complicated relationship between immigrant Mus-
lims and African-American Muslims in the United States.
Yet because much of their focus is on Arab experi-
ences of marginalization, their emphasis tends to be on
the experiences of “immigrant” Muslims rather than on
other groups.
The second complication follows from the first. In de-
scribing the processes of “racialization” Muslim Amer-
icans experience, these authors identify the source of
racial identification outside of the Muslims themselves,
generally in cultural processes (popular discourse, news,
entertainment media) and state policies (immigration
laws, special registration). To the extent the authors talk
about how people navigate their racial identity them-
selves, it is generally as a means of explaining what it
means to be Arab or an Arab Muslim rather than what
it means to be Muslim more generically, or even simply
an immigrant Muslim, at least within a racial context.
3.2. How a Racialized Religion Fits into the Ethnic
Paradigm
Definitions of Islam often understand it as a religion: Es-
posito’s (2016) standard textbook calls Islam one of the
world’s religions in the very first page of the introduc-
tion. Yet it not as obvious as it might appear what is
religious and what is not. In fact, the deconstruction of
the category of religion has been an important conversa-
tion within religious studies (Masuzawa, 2005), anthro-
pology (Asad, 1993), and sociology (Guhin, 2014), all of
them suggesting that calling something religious is just
as much a political and normative movement of power
as it is a description of a certain element of social life.
Nonetheless, today in the United States, even if some
conservative Christians describe Islam as unworthy of
the category of religion, it is generally the case that Is-
lam is considered a religion, at least in so far as mosques
are given the tax-exemptions provided to churches and
Muslims are ensured (though not always ensured) cer-
tain religious privileges in state institutions that parallel
other religious privileges.
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Yet Islam, it seems, is more than just a religion.
That Islam works as a category relatively separate from
(though perhaps replaceable for) someone’s ethnicity is
sociologically relevant, as it can describe various social
processes, including how second generation Muslim im-
migrants develop strategies of negotiation for engaging
their parents’ ethnic identity. In Naber’s (2005) study of
second generation Arab-American Muslims, she shows
how an “ideological framework” of “Muslim first/Arab
second” allows her respondents to form an identity cate-
gory that gives them space to negotiate cultural and gen-
der expectations with immigrant parents. Furthermore,
her “research participants tended to argue that ‘while
Arab culture is based on racism, Islam is based on racial
equality’” (Naber, 2005, p. 490). There are two important
pieces here: first, that “Muslim” is even capable of replac-
ing a category like Arab implies that “Muslim” is coming
to function as an ethno-racial category, and second, as
will be described in more detail below, the “colorblind-
ness” of Islam can be used to obfuscate and reify a kind
of immigrant Muslim privilege (Naber, 2005, p. 491).
Naber is not the only one to describe how second-
generation immigrant Muslims are forming a “Muslim-
first, ethnicity-second” ideological commitment. “Amer-
ica’s Muslim student movement”, Abdo (2006) writes:
[H]as gone a long way toward creating a multicultural
Islam among second-generation Muslims. Students
from diverse ethnic backgrounds join the Muslim Stu-
dents’ Association and encounter, often for the first
time,Muslims outside their own ethnic groups. (Abdo,
2006, p. 196).
Bilici (2012) also describes howmany second-generation
American Muslims prize the American Muslim commu-
nity for the opportunity it provides to live a “free” Is-
lam unfettered by the constraining and often conserva-
tive cultures in majority Muslim countries, and, some-
times, from immigrant parents. Such a commitment to
a Muslim-first, ethnicity second ideology seems counter-
intuitive given how many mosques have one dominant
ethnicity (Bagby, 2012; Karim, 2008). Yet Muslims are
more than theirmosques, and high schools (like the ones
I studied), Muslim Students’ Associations, and other
forms of Muslim cultural work provide opportunities to
create an American ummah (Arabic for community of all
Muslims) not necessarily linked to any one ethnicity. In
his account of American Islam, Bilici (2012) shows how
cultural and political expressions ranging from Muslim
stand-up comedy toMuslim political activism provide op-
portunities to create a different kind of emergent Ameri-
can Muslim identity, one not necessarily tethered to eth-
nic origins.
I also found this second-generation Islam-first com-
mitment in my own work. A South Asian female student
at Al Amal, Sara, complained to me that the school was
more ethnically conscious than her previous one, which
she described asmore “Muslim”: “Here it’s more of a cul-
ture”, she told me:
There’s a lot of Arabs here and over there it was so
mixed, it was mostly children of converts, so people
weren’t always asking where are you from. Like when
I got here, people would always askmewhere are you
from? And I was like, Um, New York?
Sara wants to be simply a Muslim from New York, in
the way that many second-generation Muslims empha-
size their Islam over their cultural backgrounds. Indeed,
many second-generationMuslims told me how their par-
ents’ Islam was more “culture” than “religion”: as Bilici
describes, it’s in America that Islam can be truly pure. As
described above, there is a liminal kind of freedom in
Sara’s recognition that an Islam beyond ethnic or racial
identity is possible, and it presents various strategies of
action, some of them “racial hinges” towards either a col-
orblind ideology of racial indifference or, potentially, the
kind of “brown” solidarity I will discuss in the conclusion,
a solidarity that both extends beyond but still recognizes
ethnic and racial identities and marginalizations. Yet all
of this moves a bit beyond what Sara wanted, which was
simply to have the freedom to be a New York Muslim
without any ethnicity necessarily attached to it. Yet this
is a racial hinge as well, given how hard it would be for a
black Muslims to ever stop being seen as black (Jackson,
2005, 2009).
Sara’s desire for an integration into a broader “Mus-
lim” identity category is theoretically important for an-
other reason: it challenges contemporary theories of eth-
nic assimilation. Debates about segmented assimilation
(Zhou, 1997) often focus on Latin American and East
Asian immigrants and to which segment of the society
they will assimilate, usually not describing the role of
religion in those processes (see Warner, 2007). Except
for certain conservative critiques (Huntington, 2004),
there is much less concern about Latin American religion,
which is usually Catholic or Protestant. Similarly, except
for concern about Islam, South Asian and East Asian reli-
gions are usually not considered especially important ei-
ther (Warner, 2007), except perhaps as a means of con-
necting to the country of origin rather than as a means
of non-national or non-ethnic solidarity, as was once the
fear with Catholics and Jews and is now the fear about
Muslims. As such, the middle way of “selective accultur-
ation” does not quite capture the experience of second
generation Muslim Americans to the extent they seek
the kind of Muslim second generation described above.
In Portes and Rumbaut’s (2016) telling, selective accul-
turation “means the acquisition of English fluency and
American cultural ways along with preservation of cer-
tain key elements of the immigrant culture, of which lan-
guage is paramount” (Portes & Rumbaut, 2016, p. 350,
italics in original). Yet for many second generation Amer-
ican Muslims, to the extent that language matters, is
not necessarily the language of their parents, but Arabic,
the language of the Qur’an. For example, Grewal (2013)
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shows how a variety of second generation Muslims and
Muslim converts travel to theMiddle East partially for re-
ligious instruction, but also to learn the sacred language
of Islam. Similarly, in Muslim Students’ Associations and
Muslim organizations across the country, there is a nor-
mative commitment to gaining fluency in Arabic for the
most devout of Muslims, and many learn at least a few
Arabic phrases to better describe religious ideas and com-
mitments (prayer becomes salah, religion becomes din,
etc.) Additionally, the very devout might seek to memo-
rize the Qur’an in Arabic (becoming a hafiz or hafiza), a
vital goal for many Muslims around the world, especially
young people.
Both Islam and the language (but not the ethnicity)
of Arabic become important common sources of iden-
tity for second-generation immigrants from various coun-
tries, a kind of selective acculturation distinct from those
usually examined by sociologists of immigration. As a re-
sult, immigrant Muslims again gain access to a kind of
racial liminality in that they are able to claim that their re-
ligious identity supersedes either ethnic or racial identity.
Contemporary Islamophobia might make such a claim
more or less difficult, but even the possibility of making
it manifests a kind of racial hinge often unavailable to
black Muslims, who are much less able to find an iden-
tity that supersedes race. The desire for an American
ummah, therefore, runs the risk of forming a kind of “col-
orblind Islam”. However, this is not to be cynical: it is
entirely possible to create an American ummah that is
still sensitive to racial inequality, as I will describe in the
next section.
4. Immigrant Muslims’ Racial Strategies of Action
In their study of white Evangelicals’ racial attitudes and
behaviors, Emerson and Smith (2000) import Swidler’s
(1986) concept of the cultural toolkit to explain the spe-
cific “strategies of action” that white Christians use to
engage problems of racial inequality. My use of the
toolkit concept here is slightly different and has more
in common with studies of race as an ongoing social ac-
complishment rather than a taken-for-granted social fact
(Brubaker, 2016, p. 145; Emirbayer & Desmond, 2015;
Roth, 2012, pp. 151–175). This is not to deny that race
is a powerful social construct in American life with real
weight on people’s lives regardless of their particular
social performances. As described above, the racializa-
tion of American Islam has serious material and sym-
bolic effects.
However, it remains important to recognize that race,
like any other identity, is also a social accomplishment,
one which requires the participation of various interac-
tants. People are socialized into particular scripts regard-
ing how race and ethnicity are to be understood as ap-
propriately authentic or inauthentic (Lu & Fine, 1995)
and they allow for certain performances while not allow-
ing other, at once creating and maintaining “sumptuary
codes” that “enforce social classification…consist[ing] of
rules, written or unwritten, that establish unequal rank
and make it immediately visible” (Fields & Fields, 2012,
p. 33). Such codes are most clear in the United States
regarding the relationship between whites and African
Americans, making the situations of “brown” Americans
interstitially complex, especially for those who are immi-
grants or the children of immigrants (Sanchez & Romero,
2010). Maghbouleh’s (2017) concept of the racial hinge
helps to show how liminal positions within identity cate-
gories allow for a greater breadth of social accomplish-
ments. Based on my own fieldwork and on the other
work on AmericanMuslims to which I refer in this article,
I describe two such strategies: white/colorblind accultur-
ation and black appropriation, suggesting in the conclu-
sion that brown solidarity might be a third.
4.1. White/Colorblind Acculturation
Al Amal’s senior graduation ceremonywas conducted off-
site in a large ballroom a fewmiles from the school, with
40 or so seniors all sitting in robes in the front row, their
families gathered behind them. The commencement
speaker, a professor from a nearby university, urged the
graduates and their families: “As Muslim Americans, we
have to represent ourselves…we have to dowhat the Ital-
ians, Irish, and African-Americans all did before us, we
have to challenge those stereotypes…for some people
when you say Muslim, it means terrorist, and we have to
challenge this”. Note how the speaker conflates race, eth-
nicity, and religion, all at once, providing a narrative of
progress through which Muslims—whatever they are—
will eventually become American. Note as well how the
struggles of African Americans are narrated in the past
tense and in parallel with the integration efforts of white
ethnics, thereby no longer requiring present solidarity,
a move paralleled by many white Americans. Immigrant
Muslims’ use of racial hinges is clear here: in this read-
ing, whites’ racial distinction of Muslims as “other” is a
door immigrant Muslims can move through, something
they can turn with effort and work (even if they run the
risk of the door being turned back upon them by people
assuming they are terrorists).
While 9/11 challenged American Muslims’ attempts
at full assimilation, it is by no means a lost goal. As the
above quote demonstrates, many Muslim immigrants
seek to assimilate broadly with the rest of the United
States. That does not necessarily mean they want to be-
come white as much as it means that they want to be-
come American (Bilici, 2012), viewing American identity
as something that can be, with some effort, reconciled
with the Muslim faith. Of course, it remains an open
question whether such American aspirations are neces-
sarily white. Both Muslim schools I studied seemed well
described by Portes, Fernandez-Kelly and Haller’s (2005)
description of immigrants’ aspirations towards “the en-
viable lifestyles of the mostly white upper middle class”
(Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, & Haller’s, 2005, p. 1004), yet
the whiteness of this middle class might be an incidental
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rather than an essential characteristic. The real challenge
is proving the degree to which they are a part of America.
As Grewal (2013) describes, this need to defend
Americanness is not a problem for indigenous blackMus-
lims, who are clearly American, even if America’s racial
codes assign them a secondary social status. African
Americans have the ‘social citizenship” Muslim immi-
grant communities lack, and these communities hope
they can gain that citizenship while being able to en-
joy racial privileges African Americans cannot (Grewal,
2013, pp. 10–11). But does gaining such social citizen-
ship require acknowledging the problem of cross-racial
solidarity? In my fieldwork and in some of the studies de-
scribed here, certain immigrant Muslims seek an Ameri-
can identity that is not necessarily white but is certainly
colorblind, that is, able to “see past” race. These immi-
grant Muslims with a colorblind ideology (Bonilla-Silva,
2006) resent the ways that their identities are racial-
ized andmarked as different. The colorblind ideology, ac-
cording to Manning, Hartmann, and Gerteis (2015), con-
sists of three “core dimensions”: abstract liberalism, min-
imization of racism, and cultural racism. That emphasis
on colorblindness is a common theme across the global
ummah (or community of Muslims), and, as noted by
Naber (2005, 2012) above, it is sometimes an accompani-
ment to an ideological commitment to putting “Muslim”
before an ethnic identity. Muslims cannot be racists, the
idea goes, because all Muslims are united in their faith.
To the extent American Muslim immigrants want to tran-
scend race—including their own racial identities—it can
alsomean they obfuscate or ignore the racial politics that
affect other Americans, including black Muslims.
That commitment to a colorblind ideology showed
up regularly at Al Amal while I was there, and it can
be found in a variety of immigrant Muslim organizations
in the United States. As the Al Amal vice principal told
me once while we were chatting about school discipline:
“When you look at this school…look at their skin colors.
They have different ethnicities, different languages, dif-
ferent culture and backgrounds. And they know that I
will not judge them based on this, theywill not be judged
by their face or background. They will be judged by their
deeds”. In the assistant principal’s comment, we see at
least two of the three characteristics of colorblindness:
a focus on abstract liberalism (equal procedures that
treat each individual autonomously) and a minimization
of racism. This focus on colorblindness therefore reifies
a kind of whiteness, so even if it does not necessarily
encourage a “whitening” of immigrant Muslims, it does
hold open the possibility of immigrantMuslimwhite priv-
ilege. Even if those immigrant Muslims may not identify
as white, and even if they are not able to leverage a col-
orblind ideology in the face of a security state and popu-
lar media that racializes them, the argument that race
does not matter seeks a movement towards a kind of
Muslim white privilege, or at least a Muslim ethnicity in
which racial identity is able to be looked past because it
is no longer recognized as essential, a “racial hinge” un-
available for African Americans (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Omi
& Winant, 2014).
This focus on colorblindness (and potential white as-
piration) extends across the American Muslim sphere.
In her dissertation on Zatyuna College, the first Mus-
lim institution of higher education in the United States,
Maryam Kashani (2014) shows how the faculty and stu-
dent body of Zaytuna—the majority from immigrant
Muslim families—often attempt to see past this color-
blindness, ensuring that African American Islam is recog-
nized as an important elements of American Islam and
describing the hard challenges of structural racism as ex-
perienced by (and sometimes maintained by) American
Muslims (Beydoun, 2018). The university was founded
by a white convert, an African American convert, and a
Palestinian American (Kashani, 2014, p. 12), and its les-
son plans often seek to acknowledge and reconcile real
racial differences in American Islam, rather than simply
papering them over as so many different colors of skin
in the mosque. Yet such work is noteworthy precisely
because it is not necessarily common. Indeed, the pop-
ularity of the white convert founder Hamza Yusuf (and
the growing success of other white converts) can be in-
terpreted as an implicit wish for cultural assimilation, as
Kashani (2014) describes: “As a symbolic figure for a type
of American Islam, Yusuf embodied the possibilities for
other Muslims to assimilate, whether they were from
Pakistan, Syria, Indonesia, or Afghanistan…signify[ing]
aspirations of whiteness and cultural citizenship in an
American landscape of racial inequality and subjuga-
tion” (Kashani, 2014, pp. 114–115; see also Grewal,
2013, pp. 159–169, 305–313; Tourage, 2013). A second-
generation effort to create an “American Islam” that
moves beyond ethnic differences betweenMuslim immi-
grant groups can, ironically, reproduce awhite colorblind
ideology through ignoring or at least downplaying what
Sherman Jackson (2009) calls “the problem of black suf-
fering”. To be clear, this is not to argue that all immigrant
Muslims seek such a colorblind ideology or that an Amer-
ican ummah is necessarily colorblind. Indeed, the key ar-
gument of this article is that immigrant Muslims’ racial
hinges give them access to a variety of racial strategies
of action, and the degree to which these are used by any
one individual or group—as well as how often they are
used—are separate empirical questions.
4.2. Black Appropriation
American Muslims go back to the country’s precolonial
roots, with African slaves keeping their Muslim heritage
as best they could despite slave-owners’ attempts to
strip them of their pasts (GhaneaBassiri, 2010; Hussain,
2016). Black communities were instrumental in the de-
velopment of various forms of American Islam (Grewal,
2013, pp. 79–124), forms which have been in an uneasy
tension with the growing number of immigrant Muslims
in the United States since changes in immigration laws in
1965 (Jackson, 2005, pp. 131–169). One reason for this
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tension is the question of whether the uneasy solidarity
between African-AmericanMuslims and immigrant Mus-
lim can overcome racial inequalities, as well as some im-
migrants’ support for (or at least silence regarding) the
white supremacy that keeps those inequalities alive.
In my time at Al Amal, I regularly heard an Arab boy,
a junior, use the n-word with other students. I asked him
once if he knew any black people, and he said no. He was
a brown-skinned Arab, one of many at Al Amal who, like
many in America, loves hip hopmusic and identifies with
certain elements of black culture, especially a key ele-
ment of much of themale student experience at Al Amal:
basketball (O’Brien, 2017; see alsoWarikoo, 2011). Black-
ness, for these students, was associated with pleasure,
and they felt, as do white people in a colorblind society
(Rodriquez, 2006), that they could sample that pleasure
without any moral problem or obligation. Blackness, for
them, was also associated with African American iden-
tity (which was not represented at their school) rather
than simple phenotype. I accompanied some boys to the
school’s storage area, where they had to clean out some
boxes of textbooks. They were looking at old pictures
of students and saw an African-American student. “Re-
member him?” asks one. Another said: “Oh yeah, he was
black, so we were all like, ‘yo, can you play [basketball]?’
and he was like, ‘yeah I can play’ and then we saw him
playing and like, he was terrible!” They all laughed. “We
were like, ‘finally, a black guy, and he can’t even play bas-
ketball!’” They laughed again. Apparently, they did not
make assumptions about the black students from Egypt
and sub-Saharan African then at the school.
Like many American whites, these immigrant Mus-
lims felt they could appropriate black culture in their own
experience, even judging the qualities of African Ameri-
canMuslims based on how they lived up to certain racial-
ized expectations. Yet immigrant Muslim appropriation
is not quite the same as white appropriation: as I have
described above, immigrant Muslims are also racialized,
and are sometimes referred to as “the new blacks” (Bay-
oumi, 2015, pp. 185–209). Yet such solidarity is not nec-
essarily equally shared, and there are ways that black
and Latino Muslims, for example, can feel as though im-
migrant Muslims can use their experience of racialized
marginalization as a pass for the ability to appropriate
black culture (Khabeer, 2016). This is another racial strat-
egy of action at least potentially available to American
immigrant Muslims, a “racial hinge” through which they
can experiment with black identity in a way seemingly
unavailable to whites.
Khabeer’s (2016) book, Muslim cool: Race, religion,
and hip hop in the United States, analyzes the role of
black culture in developing a kind of “Muslim Cool”, al-
lowing for cross-ethnic solidarities and artistic creation
in the service of anti-racism. Yet too often, she argues,
immigrant Muslims love black culture but not black peo-
ple, appropriating and instrumentalizing black traditions
without recognizing the centrality of the black experi-
ence to broader Islamic history and to contemporary
American Islam (see also Jackson, 2005; Rouse, 2004).
Khabeer’s broader argument is an insistence that such
appropriation is not the only way in which immigrant
Muslims can approach native black Muslims and black
culture (see also O’Brien, 2017). Indeed, “Muslim cool”
is, for Khabeer, both an aesthetic and normative goal of
cross-racial solidarity within the ummah.
Yet to the extent that immigrant Muslims’ relation-
ship to African Americans is one of appropriation rather
than solidarity, it is because of the colorblind ideology
described above, a sense in which black culture can be at
once appropriated and enjoyed yet simultaneously used
as ameans of explaining inequality. That culture explains
inequality is important, as it allows for a “racism with-
out racists” (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Manning, Hartmann, &
Gerteis, 2015), insisting that it is not necessarily any-
thing racial but rather cultural that explains (and justi-
fies) inequalities.
In a conversation I had with Dafir, the Palestinian
teacher at Al Amal, he distinguished between recent
African immigrants and African Americans:
AfricanAmericans, a lot of them, they’re disrespectful,
and they don’t work hard. Africans, they come here to
work. But with African Americans, they don’t have to
work and so they don’t. And when they see people
who are working, they judge them. They don’t know
the value of a dollar.
I asked him where Arabs fell in his racial categorization
and for him, the difference came down to immigration
status, giving me a particular form of the segmented
assimilation argument: “Arabs born and raised there,
they’re like Africans. Arabs born and raised here, they’re
no different from African Americans”. What to make of
Dafir’s claims? There’s obviously racism here, yet what
does the racism accomplish? It allows Dafir to situate
himself as a moral and racial arbiter, and to manifest a
level of humility: after all, he is also an Arab “born and
raised here”. In this story, African Americans become the
opposite of the (implicit) goal of assimilation, a process
best exemplified by hard-working immigrants like Dafir’s
parents. The storymanages to show loyalty, racial distinc-
tion, and humility all at once, all uttered in a seemingly
colorblind rhetoric: after all, Dafir might say (though I did
not ask him about it), if Africans and African Americans
can be so different, surely this is not about race. As Dafir
made clear above, he is not white, and neither does he
want to be. Yet he also does not want to be like African-
Americans. His position of racial liminality allows him
access to these racial hinges, able to make pronounce-
ments that, inmaking them, situate his identity as racially
liminal, neither white nor African-American yet able to
talk expertly—at least in his mind—about both.
Jackson (2005, 2009) describes how immigrant Mus-
lims situated themselves in opposition to African Amer-
icans from their first days in the United States, thereby
maintainingwhite supremacy and anti-black racism even
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if they did not explicitly assimilate into the white major-
ity (see also Beydoun, 2018, pp. 162–173; Prickett, 2015).
Even 9/11, Jackson argues, has not really changed the sit-
uation (Jackson, 2005, p. 95). Importantly, a gradual shift
towards an “American Islam” that is more than simply
an accumulation of various ethnic forms does not solve
this problem as it maintains the “ethnicity paradigm”
Omi and Winant (2014) describe, making black simply
one ethnicity among others and thereby occluding the
differences between racist structures and ethnic distinc-
tions. Yet such misrecognition can go even further. In
Atiya Husain’s (2017) study of white and black Muslims,
an African-American man named Malik told her: “Mus-
lims don’t understand black folks”. “But doesn’t ‘Mus-
lims’ include black folks?” the author asked. “You know
what I mean”, he responded, “It’s the same for me”. (Hu-
sain, 2017, p. 10). Husain’s respondent shows how a col-
orblind ideological commitment to immigrant assimila-
tion toAmerica (if not necessarilywhiteness) canocclude
not only the blackMuslim experience, butMuslim “black
folks” themselves. It is through such occlusion that ap-
propriation becomes possible. Yet more importantly for
this article’s argument, is through such occlusion that ac-
tors like Dafir are able to take advantage of this specific
racial hinge, a capacity to “see past” race and in so do-
ing situate their Muslim experience as the central con-
cern of Islam in America and their racial experience as
theway to understand how Islam is racialized. One of the
many tragedies of Islam in America is how often scholars
of American Islam themselves reify these occlusions of
black Islam.
5. Conclusion
It is increasingly common to argue that Islamhas become
a “racialized” category in the United States, yet too of-
ten these accounts can emphasize a top-down process of
government andmedia framing. Additionally, arguments
about the “racialization” of Islam can de-emphasize the
long-standing existence of black Muslims. In contrast,
I have here suggested how immigrant Muslims’ racial ex-
periences are ambiguous, providing them with “racial
hinges” through which they can negotiate their relation-
ship to various racial and ethnic identities. These negoti-
ations are situational, relational, and contingent; as Hu-
sain argues: “the meanings of Muslimness, blackness,
and whiteness emerge through interaction with one an-
other, specifically in the interaction of different identi-
ties (race and religion) within the same person” (Husain,
2017, p. 14).
Immigrant Muslims’ “racial hinges” (Maghbouleh,
2017) allow some of them to maintain a kind of color-
blind definition of true Islam, providing them with the
capacity to strive for some of the benefits of whiteness,
even if they do not necessarily gain them, and even if
they do not necessarily claim to strive forwhiteness itself,
but rather its reification in the form of colorblindness.
Immigrant Muslims can also appropriate black culture
or seek greater relationships of solidarity with African
Americans, especially African American Muslims.
While the term is still debated, “brown” is an increas-
ingly common way of referring to immigrant Muslims’
racial identity, and perhaps “brown solidarity and anti-
racism” is another racial strategy of action immigrant
Muslims might take (Silva, 2010). Even black and white
Muslims, in the moments they are recognized as Mus-
lim, can become “brown” (Husain, 2017, p. 14). However,
while theorists might describe Muslims as “brown”, the
degree to which most immigrant Muslims would agree
to such a classification is a separate question, as is the
degree to which black Americans would find the identity
a helpful means of solidarity. Yet what makes a “brown”
identity attractive to some is the degree to which it ac-
knowledges immigrantMuslims’ position in an American
“racial order” (Emirbayer & Desmond, 2015), giving up
on both a colorblind ideology and an easy appropriation
of black (and Latino) identity. In this sense, “brown iden-
tity” should not replace the problems of others’ suffer-
ing (Jackson, 2009; Silva, 2016, p. 155) but rather seek
to unite them together, paralleling Khabeer’s (2016) ac-
count of “Muslim Cool” in which young people who iden-
tify themselves as black, brown, or something else can
come together to create art, work for justice, and strug-
gle to build an anti-racist ummah.
There remains much to understand in how the racial-
ization of Islam works at the micro-level and how it re-
lates to the experience of other racial identities. Future
scholars might also examine the question of brown iden-
tity and the degree to which it is understood by immi-
grant Muslims themselves as a meaningful description.
Further studies might also take up the question of how
immigrantMuslims relate to other racial, ethnic, and reli-
gious groups, including East Asians, Latinos, non-Muslim
South Asians, non-Muslim Middle Easterners, and sub-
Saharan African immigrants, bothMuslim and not. Doing
so might provide a means of understanding how classifi-
cations of Islam function at the micro-level. These stud-
ies would also help develop Wilde’s conception of “com-
plex religion” as differences in race, ethnicity, and immi-
grant status potentially lead to significant differences in
life outcomes and other measures of inequality (Wilde &
Tevington, 2017, pp. 7–8).
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